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In 2005, convicted child-rapist Grady Nelson 
brutally murdered his wife Angelina. After 
stabbing her 61 times, he left a butcher knife 
embedded in her brain. Later, his own life 
hung in the balance as the Florida jury that 
convicted him of murder next had to decide 
whether he would be executed or spend his 
life behind bars. Nelson’s attorney offered to 
provide neuroscientific evidence — specifi-
cally, quantitative electroencephalography 
(QEEG), introduced through the testimony 
of a neuroscientist — to suggest that Nelson 
had potentially relevant brain abnormali-
ties. The jury should hear this evidence, the 
attorney argued, because although it may not 
excuse Nelson’s behaviour, it should mitigate 
his punishment1.
In a different case, in 2010, psychologist 
Lorne Semrau went on trial in federal court 
for allegedly masterminding healthcare fraud 
in connection with psychiatric care that 
two of his companies provided for patients 
in nursing homes. His attorney offered to 
introduce neuroscientific evidence — specifi-
cally, the results of a functional MRI (fMRI) 
test, introduced through the testimony of a 
neuroscientist — to suggest that Semrau was 
truthful when he claimed that any overbill-
ings were accidental (rather than purposeful, 
as the government would have to prove). 
Among the evidence2,3 he offered to intro-
duce was the neuroscientist’s conclusion that: 
“Dr. Semrau’s brain indicates he is telling the 
truth in regards to not cheating or defrauding 
the government” (REF. 2).
In these cases, and a steadily increasing 
number of similar cases in both criminal 
and civil courts, neuroscientific evidence 
has been introduced to support a party’s 
legal claim as well as to argue its irrelevance 
or invalidity (by the opposing party)4–6 
(N. Farahany, personal communication). 
That evidence comes sometimes in the form 
of documentary neuropsychological reports 
and sometimes in the form of neuroscien-
tists testifying in court proceedings. Some of 
these neuroscientists appear willingly, and 
some reluctantly. It appears that sometimes 
their involvement in a case sparks a plea bar-
gain or settlement before trial7,8. The princi-
pal importance of the example cases above is 
to raise this question: when and how should 
neuroscientists participate in litigation?
In barely a decade, a distinct field of ‘law 
and neuroscience’ has emerged4,6–20, accom-
panied by a sharp rise in both conceptual and 
empirical scholarship (FIG. 1), conferences (see 
neurolaw conferences on The MacArthur 
Foundation Research Network on Law and 
Neuroscience website), international neu-
rolaw societies (see the external links page 
on The MacArthur Foundation Research 
Network on Law and Neuroscience website), 
‘law and neuroscience’ courses being taught 
in law and other departments internationally, 
a forthcoming coursebook21, new neurosci-
ence–law joint-degree programmes, and so 
on. In light of the possibility that techno-
logical advances might aid the legal system, 
and in view of how important it is for law to 
separate neuroscientific wheat from chaff, 
the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation has funded two consecutive 
interdisciplinary, collaborative research ini-
tiatives in the United States — the Law and 
Neuroscience Project and The MacArthur 
Foundation Research Network on Law and 
Neuroscience. These developments as well 
as the rising number of references to neu-
roscientific evidence in court opinions4,22 
(N. Farahany, personal communication), 
suggest that neuroscientists may be called 
upon with increasing frequency — and with 
implications and consequences yet unknown 
— to lend their expertise to matters of 
legal import.
Whether this will provide a net gain 
in the fair and effective administration 
of justice is a topic of current debate23–26. 
But the new types and increasing quality 
of neuroscientific evidence — particularly 
brain imaging techniques, on which we pri-
marily focus here — ensure that the interac-
tion between law and neuroscience is both 
unavoidable and intensifying. This article 
explores some of the reasons why neuro-
scientific evidence is being offered in legal 
proceedings, several key features of law 
that neuroscientists may wish to know and 
several important clarifications about and 
limitations of neuroscience that the legal 
system needs to learn from neuroscientists.
Why neuroscience?
Why is the legal system increasingly turning 
to neuroscientists? The answer is simple: it 
does so in the hope that new technologies may 
help to satisfy many acute and long-lingering 
needs, including the law’s need to answer 
questions such as: is this person responsible 
for his behaviour? What was this person’s 
mental state at the time of the act? How much 
capacity did this person have to act differently? 
What are the effects of addiction, adolescence 
or advanced age on one’s capacity to control 
behaviour? How competent is this person? 
What does this person remember? How accu-
rate is this person’s memory? What are the 
effects of emotion on memory, behaviour and 
motivation? Is this person telling the truth? 
In how much pain is this person? How badly 
injured is this person’s brain?
Because society uses the legal system to 
help regulate the behaviour of its citizens, the 
legal system turns to disciplines (typically 
social science disciplines, such as psychology, 
economics and sociology) that claim to have 
special insights into the causes of human 
behaviour, what patterns human behaviour 
manifests and how people are likely to react 
as law shapes incentive structures within 
social environments27. Neuroscience may in 
part be ‘hot’ in law because its technological 
sexiness may lend it persuasive power and 
because legal advocates are, in turn, always 
alert for potentially persuasive ways to aid 
their clients. However, in our view, neurosci-
ence has become attractive mainly because 
many legal professionals, courts and com-
mentators hope or believe that it can provide 
a tool that not only usefully supplements tra-
ditional social science perspectives but that 
also may be, in some contexts, more objective 
and powerful.
Not surprisingly, some substantial 
fears accompany that hope. In our collec-
tive experience at the neuroscience–law 
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(neurolaw) intersection, it has become 
clear that many people — both inside and 
outside of the legal professions — worry 
that neuroscience is too complex and too 
technical in nature for laypeople to under-
stand and apply, even when particular neu-
roscientific evidence could, if it is properly 
understood, be useful to law’s purposes. 
In addition, they worry about the risks of 
over-reductionism, the possible low explan-
atory power of neuroscientific evidence 
(that is, when the neuroscience evidence 
adds little beyond the behavioural evi-
dence) and — more importantly — about 
the general problem of drawing inferences 
about the consequences of brain states that 
are defensible both scientifically and within 
the specific legal context that each case 
may present. These worries are fanned by 
concerns about, among others, the ecologi-
cal validity of laboratory-based studies, the 
challenges of drawing inferences relevant 
to an individual from group-based stud-
ies and the potential over-persuasiveness 
of neuroimages18,25,26,28–46. We believe that 
neuroscientists can play crucial roles in 
addressing these concerns during legal 
proceedings.
Four roles for neuroscientists 
There are four main ways in which a neu-
roscientist may become involved in litiga-
tion. The first is as a so-called ‘fact witness’ 
(sometimes called ‘lay witness’). Fact wit-
nesses can testify about the underlying facts 
of a case on the basis of their own personal 
knowledge, which is grounded in direct expe-
rience with the parties involved in the case or 
issues in the case. For example, the neurolo-
gist who first examined a plaintiff after his 
injury in an accident may be called upon to 
recount her examination and findings.
The second way is as a non-witness 
consultant. In this role, they may help 
attorneys to evaluate neuroscientific evi-
dence offered by the opposing side, suggest 
questions an attorney should ask opposing 
witnesses or provide general, non-testimo-
nial advice about the strength of a claim, 
about the significance of a finding or about 
who else should be consulted as the case 
develops.
The third way is to join an effort to 
prepare a so-called ‘amicus brief ’ for cases 
before the US Supreme Court. In suitable 
circumstances, such briefs can be submit-
ted by individuals or organizations that are 
not party to a lawsuit but who nonetheless 
believe they have information or perspec-
tives that the Court should consider when 
deciding the case. For instance, in the past 
decade, amicus briefs involving neuroscien-
tists were filed in three prominent Supreme 
Court cases regarding criminal punishments 
of juvenile offenders47–49.
The fourth way to become involved in 
litigation is as an expert witness50. If the 
judge in the case decides that a proposed 
witness is qualified (on the basis of special-
ized knowledge that has typically been 
acquired through education, training and 
experience) to be designated as an expert 
witness, then that person can offer opinions 
about, or interpretations of, the facts in the 
case — something that fact witnesses are 
ordinarily not allowed to do. In the remain-
der of this article, we focus on issues that 
neuroscientists might encounter when acting 
as an expert witness.
Legal and scientific cultures
Suppose that, after much discussion, review 
and reflection, a neuroscientist agrees to be 
an expert witness. The neuroscientist’s expe-
rience as an expert witness will depend on 
(among other things) his or her understand-
ing of a number of things about the distinct 
cultures and contexts of neuroscience and 
law. We will discuss six crucial matters of 
which neuroscientists should be aware when 
acting as expert witnesses.
Decisions under uncertainty. At the most 
general (and therefore over-simplified) 
level, we can consider science to be about 
facts and law to be about values. More 
specifically, we could say that science aims 
to discover facts, and thus to increase our 
collective knowledge of reality through 
various inductive and deductive means, 
including hypothesis-driven experimenta-
tion. By contrast, law aims to pursue the 
ends of society’s values — with respect to 
orderly, productive and just behaviour. It 
does this through various legislative, execu-
tive and judicial means, including through 
courts that exist for one single reason: to 
resolve disputes.
There are of course many other impor-
tant aspects of the legal system that distin-
guish it from the scientific system. One is 
that trial courts typically must decide who 
wins and who loses a case. There are no 
ties, there are no maybes and there is no 
tabling the issue for further court-managed 
study. A second key aspect is that courts 
cannot completely control when they must 
decide. As a case progresses, there comes a 
Figure 1 | Cumulative growth in the number of ‘law and neuroscience’ publications. Th  figure 
shows a sharp rise in the number of publications in the ‘neurolaw’ field between 2003 and 2013. 
These publications include both conceptual and empirical scholarship in the neurolaw field. Figure 
is reproduced from the Law and Neuroscience Bibliography on the website of The MacArthur 
Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience.
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time when the decision must be made. At 
that moment, a civil plaintiff either wins 
or loses, and a criminal defendant is either 
freed or not.
A third and crucial aspect is a function of 
the prior two: jurors and judges must almost 
always make decisions under conditions of 
considerable uncertainty. The decisions they 
make depend not only on the level of uncer-
tainty but also on the specific legal context. 
Roughly speaking, the more consequential 
the decision, the more certain the decision-
makers must be (that is, the higher the ‘bur-
den of proof ’ must be) before they should 
decide that a claim or allegation is meritori-
ous. For example, when life or liberty is at 
issue in criminal cases, the US Constitution 
requires proof “beyond a reasonable doubt”. 
By contrast, to win a civil trial, at which only 
amounts of money are at issue, a mere “pre-
ponderance of the evidence” (the US stand-
ard, akin to the “balance of the probabilities” 
in the United Kingdom) is required. Of 
course, research scientists can and do have 
to deal with uncertainties of various kinds 
in their own research. However, the nature, 
range and contexts of that uncertainty in 
science are considerably distinct from those 
in law. The key point is that courts cannot 
avoid — as scientists generally can (and often 
should) by continuing their own research 
— making high-impact decisions in the 
face of imperfect information. Keeping this 
systemic constraint in mind helps to make 
sense of many otherwise puzzling features of 
litigation.
How to approximate truth. Because science 
and law have different functions and therefore 
different attitudes with respect to conditions 
of uncertainty, science and law often pursue 
truth quite differently51,52. Science engages in 
an iterative process of trial, error and refine-
ment in pursuit of generalizable knowledge; 
indeterminate experiments can be followed 
by new and better experiments. By contrast, 
at least one major component of the legal 
system — the resolution of disputes in court 
— requires individual courts to repeatedly 
engage in particularized, one-shot decision-
making that often has no generalizable bear-
ing on other disputants or on the systemic 
accumulation of a greater body of knowl-
edge. Courts cannot conduct experiments, 
nor order any, in pursuit of the truth. Instead, 
they depend on an adversarial process that 
should, it is hoped, reveal the relevant truths 
by harnessing, within an ultimately gladiato-
rial arena, the competitive spirits, economic 
interests and ethical obligations of each 
party’s lawyers.
Put another way, science generally 
approximates truths by hypothesis-testing, 
whereas the legal system frequently approxi-
mates truths by evaluating what happens 
when two highly incentivized teams shoul-
der a legally imposed duty to gather evi-
dence and to argue in favour of two directly 
opposite propositions. This difference has 
major implications for the experience of 
neuroscientists in court.
Experts on the stand. One consequence of 
the legal system’s trying to grind truth from 
between the abrasive surfaces of two oppos-
ing parties is the unpleasant phenomenon of 
cross-examination — the process by which 
the other side tries to expose flaws in the 
expert witness’s background, credentials and 
reasoning. This can come as a shock to the 
expert witness, especially if he or she fails to 
anticipate it or fails to take it in stride. The 
way this process works, systemically, is that 
after the attempt at undermining is over, 
the opposing attorney will undermine the 
undermining in an effort to expose the cross-
examination as misleading, irrelevant and 
futile, and to show that the expert witness is 
indeed an expert in both the scientific and 
the legal sense.
The role of experts. Neuroscientists may 
have been called upon because of their 
expertise, which a court may have recog-
nized by ‘qualifying’ them as expert wit-
nesses. They may therefore think (at least 
the first time they appear in court) that they 
are being asked to provide a little lecture, 
with their own preferred organizational 
structure, about what they know that others 
do not. But that is not what being an expert 
witness entails. Rather, expert witnesses 
are typically required to answer specific 
questions, which often emerge from prior 
discussions with the lawyer. The lawyer uses 
this approach to elicit the relevant opinions 
in such a way that they are understand-
able to the judge and jury. The answers will 
ultimately be weighed by non-expert jurors 
alongside other evidence presented by both 
sides. Depending on the circumstances of 
the trial, among the factors that usually 
influence jurors’ acceptance of expert testi-
mony are their perceptions of the witness’s 
accomplishments, of any bias that may be 
revealed and of the clarity and accessibility 
of the testimony53–58.
Admissibility of expert testimony. Expert 
opinions must first be evaluated for admis-
sibility — that is, the judge will decide 
whether to even allow the jury to hear the 
opinions. In the United States, the federal 
system and each of the constituent states can 
develop their own rules about, for example, 
how to define ‘murder’ and can likewise 
develop their own procedural rules about, 
for example, how to decide whether to admit 
the testimony of scientific experts.
Many state courts in the United States 
continue to use the so-called ‘Frye test’ 
(articulated in 1923 in the case Frye v. United 
States)59 for determining the admissibil-
ity of scientific evidence. Under the Frye 
test, which is sometimes referred to as the 
‘general acceptance test’, the opinions of 
scientific expert witnesses are admissible if 
they are based on principles or techniques 
that are generally accepted as reliable in the 
relevant scientific community.
Since 1993, all US federal courts have 
been required to apply a different test to 
determine admissibility, and many state 
courts have chosen to adopt this test as 
well. That test is reflected in Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence60, which instanti-
ates the so-called ‘Daubert standard’ (named 
after the 1993 US Supreme Court case 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals61 
and further articulated in several subsequent 
cases62,63). Under the Daubert standard, 
which is sometimes described as the ‘gate-
keeping standard’, the opinions of scientific 
expert witnesses are admissible only if a 
judge is satisfied that they are helpful and 
appropriately scientific and that they have 
been correctly applied to the case at hand. 
Unlike the Frye test, which calls upon judges 
to inquire whether the science is generally 
accepted by the field, the Daubert stand-
ard requires that judges themselves assess 
whether the expert’s testimony is grounded 
in valid science. Relevant (but emphatically 
non-exclusive) factors in making this assess-
ment include: first, whether the theory or 
technique can be tested and has been tested; 
second, whether the theory or technique 
has been subjected to peer review and pub-
lication; third, the known or potential rate 
of error of the method used; fourth, the 
existence and maintenance of standards 
controlling the technique’s operation; and 
fifth, whether the theory or method has been 
generally accepted by the relevant scientific 
community64,65. 
Importantly, the decision of whether 
a neuroscientist’s evidence has passed the 
applicable test (Frye or Daubert) does 
not end the admissibility analysis. That is 
because the legal system not only requires 
that scientific testimony be directly relevant 
to a decidable issue but also recognizes that 
the value added by some kinds of evidence 
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may be outweighed by the potentially preju-
dicial effect the evidence may have on jurors. 
For example, an undisputedly accurate but 
extremely lurid and graphic photograph of 
a murder victim’s maimed body may risk 
unfairly inflaming the jurors’ passions in 
such a way as to prevent a fair trial of the 
accused, who may actually be innocent. 
Judges have the discretion to exclude such 
evidence, and they often do.
The ability of judges to exclude relevant 
evidence if its effect is very likely to be dis-
proportionately and unfairly strong provides 
an important check on the admissibility of 
scientific evidence. For example, Rule 403 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence empowers 
judges to “exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed 
by a danger of … unfair prejudice, confusing 
the issues, misleading the jury…” (REF. 66). 
Some commentators worry that the visual 
impact of brain images may be so great, 
and the memory of them so vivid, that they 
unfairly prejudice the jury in favour of the 
party offering them and that for that reason 
alone they should sometimes be excluded 
from evidence. For example, in Illinois — 
which uses the Frye test — the judge presid-
ing over the trial of murderer Brian Dugan 
allowed a neuroscientist to describe to the 
jury his methods and findings but prohibited 
him from showing the jurors any images 
of Dugan’s brain itself 67. (Experiments with 
potential jurors suggest that brain images 
sometimes have an outsized impact in actual 
court proceedings68 — by having a more per-
suasive effect on jurors than the facts warrant 
— and sometimes do not69.)
Two founts of confusion. There is a wide 
variety of resources on the subject of how 
experts should handle questions (both on 
direct examination and under cross-exam-
ination), how they should communicate in 
ways that judges and jurors can understand, 
and so on70–79. Our collective and exten-
sive personal observations of interactions 
between lawyers and neuroscientists — 
both inside and outside of litigation con-
texts — suggest there are some additional, 
important, terminology-centred issues of 
communication between the two fields that 
transcend the courtroom context.
Each field has its jargon. A neuroscientist 
may mention the ‘dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex’ and a lawyer may use common Latin 
legalese, such as ‘res ipsa loquitor’. In these 
obvious cases of jargon use, the neuroscien-
tist and lawyer are probably aware that the 
terms need explanation. However, a more 
insidious problem concerns words that are 
used in both fields but that mean completely 
different things to members of the two 
disciplines.
The first fount of confusion is when 
each discipline has a different but special-
ized meaning of the term in question. For 
example, whereas in psychology the word 
‘normative’ quickly invokes the meaning 
‘representative of the group being studied’, 
the same word in law is just as automatically 
understood to be referring to an ‘ought’ prop-
osition. That is, in law, the word ‘normative’ 
is used in reference to how something should 
be done. Other examples are terms such as 
‘theory’, ‘trial’, ‘threshold’, ‘representation,’ 
‘evidence’ and even ‘fact’.
The second fount of confusion is when 
one field uses a very common word in a very 
technical way and the other does not. To a 
neuroscientist, the word ‘significant’ brings 
p-values to mind, whereas the use in law is 
typically synonymous with ‘important’. A neu-
roscientist may use the word ‘development’ to 
mean the process by which the brain matures, 
whereas a lawyer recognizes the word to mean 
‘a thing that happened’. Similar confusion 
follows the use of terms such as ‘plastic’, ‘reli-
ability’ and many others. The same is true in 
the reverse, when law imbues common words 
with technical meanings. For example, to a 
neuroscientist, the question of whether a per-
son behaved ‘knowingly’ is largely an inquiry 
into what the person knew, whereas within 
criminal law, in which not only a bad act but 
also a culpable state of mind is required for 
someone to be convicted of a crime, ‘know-
ingly’ means something quite different. It is 
one of four highly defined and specific cul-
pable states of mind within the Model Penal 
Code80 — the four being purposefully, know-
ingly, recklessly and negligently. Each term 
carries the baggage of hundreds of thousands 
of cases and hundreds of scholarly articles 
parsing its contextual nuances.
Consequently, when neuroscientists 
and lawyers talk with one another, it is 
quite common that they focus on trying to 
understand the obvious jargon and therefore 
miss and, as a result, misunderstand the 
non-obvious jargon.
What courts need from neuroscientists
As mentioned earlier, neuroscience is 
increasingly being offered as evidence in 
litigation. The legal system needs solid evi-
dence that can aid just decision-making, 
and although neuroscience is not always 
relevant, there are many cases in which it 
can be. In these cases, the legal system needs 
neuroscientists who are willing to serve as 
experts to enable the evidence to be heard. 
Similarly, when one party plans to intro-
duce neuroscience-based evidence that has 
been improperly gathered, inappropriately 
analysed, misrepresented or is otherwise 
insufficient for the inferences that legal 
decision-makers are being urged to draw 
from it, then again the legal system needs 
neuroscientists who are willing to serve as 
experts, so that countervailing views of the 
evidence can be aired.
Neuroscientists can provide crucial 
information and perspectives for juries and 
judges, and in many cases this informa-
tion will be highly case-specific. Below, we 
discuss a number of more general science-
related points on which jurors and judges 
often need guidance.
How technologies that acquire brain data 
work — and do not. Jurors and judges do 
not need in-depth courses in neuroanatomy 
or need to learn, for example, how flip 
angles and T2 weightings work in fMRI. 
Nevertheless, no one can draw legitimate 
inferences from data if they do not have a 
good sense of how the data were obtained 
and what they actually mean. For instance, 
with respect to fMRI evidence, it is essential 
that legal decision-makers understand that 
when they see an image of colours inside 
the skull, they are not looking at something 
meaningfully analogous to an X-ray of brain 
activity in those locations but rather at the 
outcomes of statistical analyses performed 
on the data.
Structural and functional images are dif-
ferent. There are many contexts in which 
neuroscientific testimony could be relevant 
to law, such as interpreting neurotransmit-
ter deficits, explaining the memory deficits 
of patients with Alzheimer’s disease or 
explaining why someone seeking disabil-
ity benefits has impaired brain function 
after a car accident, notwithstanding the 
absence of cranial penetration. Those dif-
ferent contexts and the different kinds of 
structural or functional evidence will carry 
different opportunities for neuroscientists 
to help the legal system to avoid important 
misunderstandings.
Take MRI and fMRI as examples. 
Individuals who are unfamiliar with brain 
imaging can be forgiven for not knowing 
that functional images are meaningfully 
different from structural images. After all, 
both types of image may show structural fea-
tures in high resolution and both may have 
embedded features, such as a carpenter’s 
nail in a structural MRI scan, and a colour-
ized representation of varying statistical 
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significance in an fMRI scan. Neuroscientists 
are in the best position to point out that 
scanners do not actually generate fMRI brain 
images and that the images are instead gen-
erated through a series of (human) decisions 
about how the data should be processed, 
what statistical comparisons should be made 
and what statistical thresholds should be 
used in those comparisons. Relatedly, neuro-
scientists can usefully note that fMRI enables 
inferences to be made about the mind that 
are based on inferences about neural activity 
that are based on the detection of physiologi-
cal functions, which are thought to be reli-
ably associated with brain activities. These 
are the sorts of clarifications and caveats 
that the legal system will often need to hear. 
Neuroscientists can also explain that other 
types of neuroscience evidence are similarly 
dependent on data acquisition and analysis 
procedures.
Base rates are important and often 
unknown. The third point can be illustrated 
with this example: Herbert Weinstein, a 
65-year-old advertising executive, strangled 
his wife and threw her out of the apartment 
window, apparently to make it look like 
suicide. It turned out that he had a large 
subarachnoid cyst — highly visible on a 
positron emission tomography scan — the 
growth of which had displaced and thereby 
compressed brain tissue.
Connecting the location of the cyst with 
results of a number of academic studies 
could give reason to believe that some of 
the defendant’s cognitive capacities were 
impaired at the time of his violent act. 
However, many brain regions are involved 
in a wide variety of functions, and this con-
siderably complicates any effort to directly 
connect a particular and unusual brain 
feature with a particular past behaviour81. 
And, perhaps more importantly, we do not 
know the base rate of the phenomenon: 
how many people are walking around with 
similar cysts in their heads who do not 
strangle their wives and throw them out of 
windows?
Correlation is not causation. Suppose that 
the brains of nine out of ten killers-for-hire, 
when scanned after being arrested, each have 
the same and statistically significant abnor-
mality in brain function (compared with 
law-abiding matched controls). A neurosci-
entist can help to point out that neither this 
statistic nor the functional abnormality — 
nor the combination of the two — can legiti-
mately support a strong inference of causal 
connection between the abnormality and the 
violent acts. The neuroscientist could explain, 
for example, that although it is possible that a 
causal connection exists, there are other pos-
sibilities too. For example, it could be that 
the experience of being a repeated contract 
killer results, over time, in this particular 
statistical abberation in brain function. Or it 
could be that the two things co-vary because 
of something else entirely. Neuroscientists 
are in the best position to help decision-
makers navigate the narrow path between 
under-interpreting and over-interpreting 
neuroscientific evidence.
Brains differ. Sometimes group-averaged 
data about brain function are presented 
in court to help prove something about 
the brain of, for example, the accused. 
Although this may in some cases provide 
useful information, it is far from certain 
how often it does. In some cases, the 
law needs neuroscientists to clarify that 
although aspects of brain structure, brain 
activity and neurotransmitter function 
may be similar between subjects, there is 
often a great deal of variation across indi-
viduals. That is, scientific findings from 
studies of a group of individuals are not 
automatically or necessarily relevant to 
individual cases82–85.
Brains change. Today’s brain is not yester-
day’s brain. People do not walk around with 
miniature brain scanners on their heads 
just in case brain functioning at a particular 
moment may turn out to be important later. 
Some factors that influence brain function 
enable reasonable guesses about prior brain 
states. For example, knowing the growth rate 
of a certain tumour detected now may render 
it reasonable to believe that the tumour was 
already there, a bit smaller, 6 months ago. But 
other factors that influence brain function 
are more transient and dynamic. It can there-
fore be difficult to know today how the brain 
was functioning 6 months (or more) ago, at 
the time of the legally relevant event.
For example, it has become extremely 
common in death penalty appeals for the 
defence counsel to offer the results of a 
recent brain scan of a client who has been 
on death row for many years. Interpreting 
the relevance and meaning of such a scan is 
not easy. It is possible that it reveals a late-
discovered structural or functional condi-
tion of such a massive nature, about which 
so much is known from research studies, 
that it calls into question the prior conclu-
sion of the legal system about the person’s 
culpability at the time of the criminal act. 
But it is more often the case that a brain 
scan that shows some functional abnormal-
ity is indeterminate. It is often not possible 
to conclude that because the brain is func-
tioning or malfunctioning in a particular 
way now it was necessarily functioning or 
malfunctioning in the same way at the time 
of the criminal act. In addition to the ques-
tion of whether one can deduce any causal 
connections between the brain function and 
the act on the basis of a scan, it is also by no 
means certain that any ‘abnormality’ in the 
brain or in brain function that is detected on 
a scan caused the act that landed a person 
in jail rather than being a consequence of 
being in jail.
Conclusions
In order for wife-killer Grady Nelson to be 
sentenced to death, seven of the twelve jurors 
(a simple majority) had to vote in favour of 
executing him. Only six did, so his life was 
spared by the narrowest possible margin. 
Following the vote, it appeared that the neu-
roscientific evidence had been crucial. Two 
of the jurors who voted against executing 
Nelson told the press that the neuroscientific 
QEEG evidence had changed their minds, 
given that they had each initially favoured his 
execution. One of them said: “It turned my 
decision all the way around. The technology 
really swayed me… After seeing the brain 
scans, I was convinced this guy had some sort 
of brain problem.” (REF. 86)
By contrast, in the case of Lorne Semrau, 
the psychologist charged with fraud, his 
fMRI ‘truth verification’ evidence was not 
admitted to the jury. After 2 days of intense 
testimony from two neuroscientists (S. Laken 
and M.E.R.) and one statistician (P. Imrey), 
the court excluded the neuroscientific evi-
dence because (among other things) it failed 
two of the four recommended Daubert 
factors. Specifically, the error rates of using 
fMRI for lie detection were not known (third 
Daubert factor), and using fMRI for this 
particular purpose is not generally accepted 
within the relevant scientific community 
(fifth Daubert factor)87. Following the trial, 
Semrau was subsequently convicted of three 
counts (out of sixty) of healthcare fraud.
Whatever the merits of these two results, 
they illustrate a growing intersection of neu-
roscience with law. It is becoming increasingly 
common for lawyers to offer neuroscientific 
evidence — particularly brain images — in 
both criminal and civil litigation. In our view, 
this development is both promising and per-
ilous depending on whether and how well 
courts can come to distinguish, within the 
contours of distinctly adversarial proceed-
ings, between justifiable and unjustifiable 
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inferences. Neuroscientists have crucial parts 
to play in a legal system that needs to under-
stand and interpret neuroscientific evidence 
and to separate wheat from chaff.
The ability of neuroscientific techniques to 
shed light on important aspects of human cog-
nition has generated hope that neuroscience 
can help to answer some perennial questions 
in courts of law. However, one should keep in 
mind that it is easier to misunderstand or mis-
apply neuroscience data than it is to under-
stand and apply them correctly, and this is 
crucially important when lives and livelihoods 
depend on it. Whether courts can successfully 
navigate these challenging waters will depend 
on the level of engagement by neuroscientists.
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